Elections are an important mechanism for the peaceful transfer of power. Yet when political competition becomes polarised, institutions are weakened, or public trust erodes, electoral processes can become flashpoints for instability and violence.   

Since 2022, the Kenyan political environment has been marked by economic hardship, tax protests, opposition mobilisation, debates over the cost of living, and public anger over corruption and police conduct.  

Youth-led protests and civic activism have shown that grievances can mobilise beyond traditional party structure, and the next general election may therefore combine conventional presidential competition with broader accountability demands.  

Even though Kenya’s electoral body can be said to be well established, if it is perceived as captured, inconsistent or unprepared, public reactions can be sharp. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) composition, credibility and operational readiness are therefore central to risk reduction.   

Additionally, digital technologies and social media have transformed electoral environments around the world. While they can strengthen participation and access to information, they can also amplify disinformation, deepen polarisation and accelerate the spread of harmful narratives. Understanding these digital dimensions is increasingly important for protecting democratic processes.  

Electoral Violence  

Electoral violence is rarely caused by a single event. It often reflects deeper challenges, including weak institutions, political exclusion, polarisation, restrictions on civic space, or the misuse of digital technologies.   

Currently, politically sponsored goonism has surged and is becoming a critical threat to Kenya’s security and democratic progress ahead of next year’s general election. It’s alleged that goonism is being driven by severe youth unemployment and elite-level political financing, as hired gangs are now being deployed to disrupt events, intimidate opponents, and suppress civil society spaces.   

Human rights organisations are warning of an alarming rise in the use of hired gangs by political actors seeking to intimidate rivals, disrupt demonstrations and suppress civic activism, describing the phenomenon as a recurring feature of periods of intense political competition. According to the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), the use of politically sponsored gangs amounts to what scholars describe as “informal repression.”  

The rights organisations warn that unless authorities address the growing reliance on politically sponsored gangs, Kenya’s democratic process could face instability.   

A report by the Kofi Annan Foundation ranks Kenya second among 10 democracies at risk of electoral violence between 2026 and 2027. The foundation named after the man who mediated the country’s 2007 post-election crisis cites rising political intolerance, ethnic mobilisation and goon violence.   

In addition, economic hardship, tax burden, corruption, and police misconduct are listed among the historic injustices that could inflame public passions. IEBC, which faced another test on July 16 during the Ol Kalou by-election, is advised to ensure a transparent process to boost public confidence.  

However, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) has called for a united national effort to eradicate organised criminal gangs, stating that the country cannot afford to tolerate politically instigated violence.  

The commission’s chairperson, Kepha Nyamweya, speaking in an interview with a local TV station on July 15, said all Kenyans have a responsibility to safeguard peace and reject goonism, warning that political violence threatens national unity and democratic progress. There are also calls for a shift toward issue-based politics, with various groups stating that Kenya’s democracy would thrive only if political actors embraced civility and constructive engagement.  

Competitive Elections  

The country has a long history of competitive elections, a strong civil society, an active judiciary and an increasingly institutionalised electoral framework. At the same time, national elections have repeatedly generated violence, especially where close presidential contests interact with ethnic mobilisation, land grievances, youth unemployment and mistrust in electoral administration.  

The 2007/2008 post-election violence remains the most severe reference point, but subsequent cycles have also involved deaths, police violence, localised clashes and intense litigation.   

The 2022 election was more contained, with the Supreme Court playing a key role in resolving disputes after opposition leader Raila Odinga challenged William Ruto’s victory. The acceptance of the Court’s ruling helped prevent wider escalation, but it did not eliminate underlying distrust. With Odinga’s death in October 2025, the opposition landscape has changed, adding uncertainty around succession, alliance management and the mobilisation of his political networks.  

Judiciary  

The judiciary remains an important stabilising institution. The Supreme Court’s role in resolving presidential petitions has created a constitutional channel for high-stakes disputes. However, the effectiveness of this channel depends on public confidence that evidence is accessible, that electoral data are preserved, and that parties accept judicial authority even when they politically reject the outcome.