Kenya’s credibility as a regional arbiter in the East African Community (EAC) is hanging by a thread following the impending launch of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) coalition that aims to form a parallel civilian government on Friday in Nairobi. The launch has been met with criticism from the current government of Sudan led by Gen Burhan, who has rejected the possible formation of a government on Monday.  The planned administration, framed as the “Political Charter for the Government of Peace and Unity”, is being positioned as an effort to “restore the legitimate government” that was overthrown by remnants and militias of the Islamic movement.

Kenya’s open endorsement of the RSF has fanned the flames between Kenya and Sudan, with General Burhan recalling the Sudanese Ambassador to Kenya in January this year. Gen. Burhan also expressed his vehement disapproval of President William Ruto’s preferential treatment of Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo and his brother, Abdelrahim Dagalo, thus bringing into question Ruto’s impartiality as a mediator. It is important to note that the U.S. State Department has sanctioned the two brothers for their role in procuring arms for the RSF.  

Similarly, this, like the launch of the M23 political wing in Nairobi in 2023, invoked the same sentiments from the Democratic Republic of Congo’s President Felix Tshisekedi. During the launch of the M23 political wing, Corneille Nangaa, the former head of DRC’s electoral body, announced in a Nairobi hotel that he was creating a political-military alliance with M23 rebels and other armed groups to restore peace. He was with Bertrand Bisimwa, the head of M23, one of the largest rebel groups that have been operating in eastern DRC.

The open support of the M23 from President Ruto’s administration intensified the tension between Congo and Kenya. Previously, Kenya and DRC had enjoyed good diplomatic relations. However, after the launch, the relationship between the two states pivoted, with some of the consequences being the recall of DRC’s Ambassador to Kenya.

The legal implications of rebel recognition

Recognition provides international credibility around the world and, thus, a stronger strategic position for groups in their struggle against an opposing government at home. Legitimacy also gives rebel groups greater authority compared with their national government. This is especially true in instances where the government itself lacks the legitimacy to rule. Having a reputation as a complier with international law can earn rebel groups a medal of good citizenship in the long run. In the case of the RSF, recognition from Kenya would be as follows:

1. Existence of a political wing within the rebel organisation: Gen. Dagalo has made it clear that the launch in Kenya is a stride towards forming a parallel civilian government. 
2. Secessionists aim for clear governance objectives in an autonomous region: As of November 2023, the RSF had consolidated its territorial dominance in Darfur. By the end, it controlled four out of five Darfur states. Meanwhile, warring parties continued to fight in Khartoum to control strategic locations and secure an alternative route to connect the tri-cities in Khartoum.
3. Foreign support under the influence of human rights groups: It is clear Kenya’s position in this conflict fully backs the RSF. The grand treatment was noticeably more extravagant than what military leader Abdel Fatah al-Burhan had received, fuelling tensions between the two governments. By using Nairobi as a launchpad, the RSF is attempting to position itself as a credible political force. Further, there is a push from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) that’s teamed up with President Ruto’s other players for a High-Level Humanitarian Conference to pledge assistance for the troubled country. They pledged more than $200 million, including Kenya’s $1 million. The event in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on the sidelines of the AU Summit, brought together regional and international actors to mobilise resources for Sudan and address the devastating humanitarian crisis caused by the war.

Conclusion

Kenya’s recognition of the RSF carries profound legal and diplomatic consequences. The involvement of the RSF in forming a parallel civilian government, coupled with their territorial dominance, positions the group as a credible alternative to Sudan’s current leadership yet raises crucial questions about the legitimacy of such a move under international law. Kenya’s open endorsement of the RSF not only strains its relationship with Sudan but also jeopardises its role as a regional mediator in the EAC.

By supporting a rebel group like the RSF, Kenya risks complicating its diplomatic standing, just as it did with the M23 in the DRC. Recognition of rebel groups, though a strategic move in some contexts, can tilt the balance of power and embolden insurgent movements, which poses a legal dilemma for States operating within the bounds of international law. In the case of the RSF, this support seems to be framed as an effort to address the humanitarian crisis in Sudan, yet it blurs the lines between humanitarian intervention and the legitimation of a non-state actor’s claims to power.

Thus, while Kenya’s position may be driven by regional dynamics and the desire to act as a humanitarian leader, the legal implications of recognising rebel movements remain fraught with challenges. Ultimately, this case underscores the broader issue of what it means to legitimise a rebel group and the potential repercussions on sovereignty, stability, and international relations. The delicate balance of support and neutrality in such matters will continue to define the future of Kenya’s diplomatic role and the legal standards for rebel recognition on the global stage.