The Promise and Peril of the Kenya Sovereign Wealth Fund Bill, 2025

  • 7 Nov 2025
  • 5 Mins Read
  • 〜 by Brian Otieno

Kenya’s Draft Sovereign Wealth Fund Bill, 2025, marks a turning point in how the country proposes to manage, invest, and preserve national wealth. Behind its technical clauses lies a profound fiscal and political shift; an attempt to build long-term resilience from finite resource revenues and asset proceeds, and to embed intergenerational equity into the country’s public finance architecture. Yet the promise of a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) lies not in its creation but in the rules governing its use. Without precise fiscal anchors, robust governance, and transparency guarantees, the Fund risks being another ambitious idea consumed by political expediency.

A Blueprint for Managing National Wealth

The Bill seeks to establish the Kenya Sovereign Wealth Fund (KSWF), vested in the National Treasury, and structured around three core components: a Stabilisation Component to cushion the budget against commodity price fluctuations, a Strategic Infrastructure Investment Component to channel capital into priority projects, and a Future Generations, or Urithi, Component dedicated to long-term savings. The Fund will operate through a Holding Account domiciled at the Central Bank of Kenya, into which all eligible revenues will flow before being allocated among the three components.

Its sources of funding are primarily natural resource revenues, profit shares, royalties, proceeds from government divestments in petroleum and mining ventures, and “any other monies” gazetted by the Cabinet Secretary for the National Treasury. This makes it a resource-anchored fund, designed to transform windfalls from extractive sectors and asset sales into enduring wealth.

Institutionally, the Fund will be overseen by a Board and professionally managed by a Chief Executive and an external Investment Fund Manager. It will operate as a corporate body with powers to invest domestically and abroad, hold assets, and report annually to Parliament. While this structure mirrors global models, the Kenyan draft leaves significant operational discretion to the Cabinet Secretary, from determining annual transfer proportions to approving investment policy and disbursements. That discretion could either ensure flexibility or, more dangerously, undermine the Fund’s credibility.

Not a Revenue-Raiser, but a Fiscal Rebalancer

Contrary to some popular interpretations, the Bill is not a revenue-raising instrument. It does not create new taxes or expand the fiscal base. Its role lies in reallocating and sequencing resource flows, deciding when, how, and for what purposes the State spends its windfalls. In fiscal terms, it is a stabilisation and savings mechanism, not a revenue engine.

Properly implemented, the Fund could shield the budget from volatility, reduce reliance on debt, and serve as an investment vehicle for high-impact infrastructure. Improperly managed, it could become an off-budget slush fund that substitutes transparent fiscal processes with political discretion. The heart of that difference lies in the rules, how deposits and withdrawals are triggered, how much is saved versus spent, and who holds the pen.

Lessons from Nations That Got It Right

Globally, the most successful sovereign wealth funds share three traits: rules, transparency, and independence.

Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global is the gold standard. Every krone earned from oil goes into the Fund; the government may withdraw only up to the expected 3 per cent real return each year to finance the budget. The rule is simple, mechanical, and apolitical, ensuring both fiscal discipline and long-term wealth accumulation.

Chile, whose fund architecture inspired many developing economies, separates its stabilisation and savings functions. Deposits and withdrawals are determined by a structural balance rule that smooths copper price cycles, not by political preference. When prices soar, the fund saves; when they crash, it supports the budget.

Botswana and Alaska demonstrate another crucial lesson: public transparency sustains legitimacy. Both jurisdictions publish regular reports, audited financial statements, and investment policies, thereby insulating the funds from perception risks. The so-called Santiago Principles, the international governance standards for SWFs, enshrine precisely these ideals.

Kenya’s draft borrows from these models in intent but not yet in enforceability. Its reliance on Cabinet Secretary discretion for transfers and investments is at odds with the predictability that underpins fiscal credibility. Without formulaic deposit and withdrawal rules, the Fund risks being treated as an extension of the Exchequer rather than a shield from it.

The Macroeconomic and Corporate Ripple Effects

A well-designed Sovereign Wealth Fund could fundamentally alter Kenya’s fiscal and investment landscape. For the macroeconomy, it offers a buffer against commodity price shocks and a mechanism for intergenerational wealth preservation. It could also deepen domestic capital markets by investing in bonds, equities, and infrastructure over the long term.

However, a poorly disciplined fund introduces new vulnerabilities. If resource receipts are diverted to politically connected projects under the guise of “strategic investments,” the Fund could fuel fiscal opacity, mispricing, and crowding out of private capital. Domestic inflationary pressures may also arise if the Central Bank does not adequately sterilise significant investments.

For the corporate world, the Fund presents both opportunity and exposure. The Strategic Infrastructure Component could become a significant financier or co-investor in energy, logistics, and technology infrastructure. Firms positioned for transparency, robust ESG compliance, and long-term partnerships could gain a reliable institutional investor. At the same time, privatisations channelling proceeds into the Fund will reshape ownership in state-linked enterprises, creating acquisition and listing opportunities but also intensifying scrutiny around governance and valuation.

Corporate actors must therefore recalibrate. They will face higher due diligence thresholds, stricter procurement standards, and possibly new public-private investment frameworks aligned to the Fund’s ethical and investment mandates. Entities that prepare early for reporting, compliance, and capital-market readiness will stand to benefit most.

What Needs Recalibrating Before Passage

Parliament’s role is now to ensure that ambition does not outrun architecture. Several recalibrations are essential before the Bill becomes law.

First, deposit and withdrawal rules must be codified. Transfers to and from the Fund’s components should be based on objective triggers. For example, automatic deposits occur when resource revenues exceed a long-term benchmark, and withdrawals are limited to periods when receipts fall below it. Without this rule-based approach, the Fund’s stabilisation purpose collapses into discretion.

Second, a fiscal anchor should cap annual withdrawals. A rule similar to Norway’s “3 per cent of Fund value” principle would preserve the Urithi component for future generations while providing predictable budget support.

Third, domestic investments must be capped and governed by clear commercial criteria. If the Strategic Infrastructure Component is to fund national projects, each must undergo independent cost-benefit analysis, competitive procurement, and co-financing with private investors. The Fund must invest on merit, not mandate.

Fourth, governance independence must be guaranteed. Board appointments should be merit-based and transparent, with parliamentary vetting and staggered terms. Conflict-of-interest rules must be explicit and enforceable, complemented by an internal ethics office.

Fifth, transparency and audit obligations must be tightened. Quarterly public reports on holdings, performance, and risk exposure should be mandatory. Annual external audits should be published promptly, and the Fund’s investment policy, benchmarks, and voting guidelines should be public documents.

Finally, capitalisation rules must ring-fence asset sale proceeds. Privatisation revenues should flow directly to the Holding Account, rather than to the recurrent budget, to prevent fiscal substitution and preserve the integrity of the Fund’s capital base.

The Path Forward

Kenya’s Sovereign Wealth Fund Bill arrives at a delicate economic moment. The country faces heavy debt repayments, volatile exchange rates, and a tightening fiscal space. The instinct to save may appear counterintuitive under such pressure, yet history shows that it is precisely in lean times that discipline matters most. The Fund, if designed and managed prudently, could become Kenya’s long-term financial shock absorber and a foundation for intergenerational equity. If politicised, it could simply rearrange existing fiscal risks into a more opaque vehicle.

For the corporate sector, the emergence of a sovereign investor is both a signal and a test: a signal of Kenya’s intent to institutionalise capital for national development, and a test of whether businesses can align with transparency, sustainability, and performance-driven partnerships.

Ultimately, the Bill should be viewed not as another fiscal instrument, but as a statement of intent that Kenya will learn from resource economies that built enduring wealth rather than cyclical debt. Getting there demands clarity, rule-based discipline, and public trust. A Sovereign Wealth Fund, like national wealth itself, is only as durable as the integrity of the institutions that guard it.